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The paper presents univariate and panel unit root tests for gasoline and oil price convergence 
over the last decade. We test for the absolute versus relative version of the LOOP and 
estimate the speed of convergence as well as its development over time. Our results show that 
the absolute version of the LOOP cannot be supported. Constant price differences between 
countries remain, caused mainly by existing tax differences. The relative version of the LOOP 
is strongly supported by the data. The speed of convergence increased over time, but differs 
for gross and net-of-tax prices. We can show that national tax policy by EU member states is 
not (yet) threatened by arbitrage due to cross-border shopping. 
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1. Introduction 
The process of European integration has removed important barriers to the free 
movement of goods, services and factors of production, such as capital and labor. The Single 
European Act (1992) created an economic union, the Schengen acquis (1995) removed border 
controls and with the introduction of the Euro as the single European currency in 1999 
(European Monetary Union) exchange rate volatility disappeared. Without trade barriers price 
transparency and thus competition in Europe was expected to facilitate arbitrage, such that 
prices for identical products eventually converge (law of one price, LOOP).   
As a consequence of increasing integration, cross-border purchases of gasoline and oil 
products have become much easier over the last decade. In Germany, for example, “gasoline 
tourism” has become a common phenomenon (Michaelis, 2004) as in most neighbor countries 
fuel prices are lower. At the same time, many of these products are sold by international 
companies which sell their products all over Europe. Except for transportation costs, these 
companies can in principle offer their identical products for the same price everywhere. If the 
LOOP holds, we would therefore expect that price levels start to converge to a single 
European level.  
The existing price differences, however, do not suggest that price convergence has 
actually taken place. Whether and to what extent this impression is correct will be analyzed in 
this paper. There are two different forms of price convergence to be considered, one referring 
to prices net of taxes, the other to prices including taxes. Arguably, the main source of 
international price differences is the wedge between consumer and producer prices created by 
heavy taxation of these products.
1 Under the destination-country principle (DCP) both 
domestic and imported goods are taxed at the same rate so that only producer prices may 
converge and goods production is internationally efficient.
2 Taxation according to the origin-
country principle (OCP) implies that gross prices may equalize because of arbitrage due to 
cross-border shopping, regardless of tax differentials. Production efficiency may be distorted 
unless – despite of the OCP formally applying – producer prices converge at a significantly 
higher speed than consumer prices. In this case, discretionary national (green) tax policy is 
still sustainable and not prevented by arbitrage. We will show in the following that this 
scenario in fact applies to the situation in Europe.  
                                                 
1 Gasoline tax revenue accounts for substantial shares of national budgets of the EU member states. For Sweden, 
their share is about 7 percent, while for all EU member states together the average is slightly less than 5 percent 
(own calculation, based on OECD Revenue Statistics, 2002).  
2 This presupposes that a tax adjustment takes place whenever goods cross the border. 
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However, even if price convergence takes place, it may not lead to the same price level 
but allow for some constant level difference between countries’ price levels. This constant 
may be a consequence of geographic differences (and, thus, different transportation costs), 
differences in market power or – in case of consumer prices – taxation. It is therefore 
necessary to distinguish between the absolute and the relative version of the LOOP where 
under the relative version there is a non-zero constant. 
Based on unit root tests for gasoline and oil price convergence over the last decade, 
our results show that the absolute version of the LOOP cannot be supported. Constant price 
differences between countries remain. This implies more support for producer price 
convergence than for consumer price convergence. Our results are thus in line with the 
outcome of taxation according to the destination-country principle (which is assumed to 
induce equal producer prices), although for two products the OCP applies formally.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 investigates the markets for gasoline and oil 
products in Europe and discusses the potential effects of different tax principles on price 
convergence. The data is briefly introduced in section 3. Thereafter, section 4 presents our 
empirical results on convergence. We employ both univariate (4.1) and panel (4.2) unit root 
tests. Furthermore, we estimate the speed of convergence (4.3), test for the absolute versus 
relative version of the LOOP (4.4) and investigate whether the speed of convergence 
increased over time (4.5). Section 5 provides tests for robustness. Finally, section 6 concludes.  
 
2. European integration and the prices for gasoline and oil products 
The ultimate goal of European integration is the free movement of goods, services and 
production factors in order to allow market forces to evolve freely. Consequently – and in 
perfect markets – arbitrage should lead to a perfect international equalization of goods prices. 
Obviously there are some obstacles to perfect price convergence which will be discussed in 
the following.   
 
2.1 The market for gasoline and oil products in Europe 
The markets for gasoline and oil products are most important for European economies 
as these products are highly relevant input factors. Price movements are therefore closely 
monitored. A key characteristic of the markets is a rather inelastic demand which makes in 
particular gasoline an attractive source for tax revenue. Accordingly, most countries have 
introduced high tax rates for gasoline and oil products. Consider, e.g., euro super which is 
widely used for running private motor vehicles. Its price can be split into three components: 
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the cost price, the seller’s margin including sales promotion, and taxes (gasoline excise tax 
and VAT). In European countries, the total tax share is between 62 and almost 77 percent of 
the sales price. Gasoline and oil products other than euro super are usually taxed at lower 
rates. This holds for diesel, heating gasoil and fuel oil, which our analysis considers as well. 
They are used – partly (diesel, gasoil) or entirely (fuel oil) – for commercial or industrial 
purposes. The demand elasticity of these products is usually higher than for euro super. Firms 
may consider moving production facilities to low-tax countries which prevents governments 
from levying excessive taxes on these products.  
Regarding international tax differences, there are several possible explanations which 
result from specific national tax systems. However, there is also evidence that tax competition 
shapes the level of gasoline taxation (see, e.g., Evers, de Mooij and Vollebergh, 2004). The 
literature on tax competition suggests – among other things – that large countries like France 
or Germany tend to have a rather high tax load while in small countries it is often lower.
3 
Actual sales prices for gasoline and oil products are in line with these observations, with high-
tax countries having the relatively highest prices and vice versa.   
This, however, presupposes that tax differentials are not compensated by large cost 
prices for raw material such as crude oil. Such compensation is rather unlikely because crude 
oil is traded mainly in international spot markets and its price is therefore very similar for all 
producers. The underlying commodity price level is one of the reasons why we would expect 
price convergence. Balke, Brown and Yücel (1998) find that – at least for the U.S. – shocks to 
crude oil and gasoline prices originate mainly with supply rather than with demand. While a 
co-movement of prices can thus realistically be assumed, level differences cannot be 
excluded; the absolute version of the LOOP would then not apply.  
Production costs in the refineries differ, as well as transportation costs from the 
refinery to the buyers.
4 More generally, the specific geography of each country can potentially 
cause price differences. Nevertheless compared to the existing price differences “at the 
pump”, production costs do not appear to be indicative of price discrimination although they 
certainly contribute to a regionalization or segmentation of gasoline markets. Other possible 
explanations for different prices are differences in the market structure or the price elasticities 
                                                 
3 The fact that the highest tax rates can be found in the largest EU countries (for euro super these are France, the 
U.K. and Germany) has been explained by Kanbur and Keen (1993) in a model for international commodity tax 
competition with asymmetric country size. Due to differences in the price elasticities of demand, a small country 
will always undercut its large neighbor's tax rate because the revenue loss from the domestic population’s 
gasoline consumption is more than outweighed by additional consumption from the neighbor country. On the 
other hand, lowering the tax rate in a large country results in a substantial revenue loss and will therefore be 
avoided, even if some consumers in the border region will buy in the small country. 
4 Refined products are harder and more expensive to ship than crude oil (Brown and Yücel, 2000). 
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of demand. In some countries markets are rather competitive; in others there are few large 
suppliers exerting market power. For several products cross-country differences in elasticities 
and implicit barriers to trade can actually be observed,
5 but again compared to tax differentials 
they do not appear to be the dominant reason for price differentials in the case of the gasoline 
market. In sum, we can conclude that if gasoline or oil prices differ between countries and/or 
products tax differentials are the most obvious among the possible explanations. 
 
2.2 Principles of international taxation 
In order to fully understand the role of taxation for price convergence, we need to take 
a closer look at the principles of international taxation. We will argue in the following that the 
speed of convergence of either producer or consumer prices indicates which tax principle can 
be sustained, regardless of whether this principle applies formally or not. It is always the 
faster converging time series of prices which determines the outcome.   
In the theory of international commodity taxation, two basic principles can be 
distinguished, the OCP and the DCP. In general, there is an agreement that tax revenue from 
indirect taxation should be allocated to the destination country. In home country H, the 
relevant tax rate is therefore   which applies to both goods from home country producers 
and imported goods from foreign country F. The home country government is free to choose 
any tax rate it prefers. Goods production is internationally efficient because perfect price 




F H H F H H p p t p t p = ⇒ + = + ) 1 ( ) 1 ( . (1) 
International tax rate differentials ( ) do not have an impact on consumer 
prices, i.e. gross sales prices, in country H. Assuming non-integrated goods markets, 
 and   imply that consumer prices  , 
F H t t ≠
F H p p =
F H t t ≠ ) 1 (
i i i t p q + = F H i , = , differ between 
countries:  . In the following, the DCP will be one of the benchmark cases for our 
analysis of gasoline prices. It assumes that price convergence takes place for producer prices 
only while consumer price differences remain. If both producer and consumer prices converge 
but producer prices converge at a higher speed, the outcome of the DCP is assumed to hold. 
F H q q ≠
With perfectly integrated goods markets and the possibility of cross-border shopping, 
the outcome of perfect price competition with non-harmonized tax rates is equivalent to the 
outcome according to the OCP. There is no taxation of imported goods to which only the 
                                                 
5 See EU Commission (2001) and the literature cited therein. 
  5 
foreign tax rate   applies. Consumer prices equalize despite differing tax rates, such that 
goods production is internationally inefficient because producer prices differ:  
F t
F H F H F F H H F H t t p p t p t p q q ≠ ≠ ⇒ + = + ⇒ = for        ) 1 ( ) 1 ( . (2) 
According to the rules of international taxation, the DCP is the relevant principle of 
taxation. However, in the European Union where cross-border shopping is easy and border 
controls have been abolished sufficiently strong price competition may override this principle. 
In fact, for private purchases the EU no longer follows the DCP. However, market 
segmentation may nevertheless prevent complete price equalization. The aim of our analysis 
is therefore to investigate which type of price convergence, consumer or producer price 
convergence, can be observed in reality and which tax principle can be sustained, given this 
information. The outcomes may differ depending on the product under consideration. For 
euro super and diesel, cross-border shopping may obviously take place while the import of 
fuel oil (which is used in large quantities for industrial purposes only) can easily be taxed 
according to the DCP. 
Next to the polar cases described by DCP and OCP, one can think of scenarios in 
which neither consumer nor producer prices equalize. This may be the case under the DCP 
when price competition is imperfect in at least one of the countries. If, e.g., a firm in country 
F can exert market power and set producer prices above the competitive level (as assumed for 
country H, such that ) but tax rates are low in this country ( ), the consumer 
price in F may nevertheless be lower than in H ( ). Under the DCP, foreign products 
will not be bought in the home country. Neither producer nor consumer prices can equalize. 
Notice, however, that as soon as the possibility for cross-border shopping (according to the 
OCP) becomes available buyers from H will start to shop in F.  
F H p p <
F H t t >
F H q q >
Whether consumer or producer prices converge (at a higher speed) has important 
policy implications. Consumer price convergence shifts the tax burden to the producers, 
which leads to a competitive disadvantage for firms in high-tax countries. Firms may opt to 
leave the country if taxes are not lowered. Countries may therefore engage in tax competition 
on this issue. Under the DCP, this is unlikely to occur but there is clearly an incentive for 
(illegal) cross-border imports. With increasing mobility of citizens, this principle cannot be 
sustained. 
 
  6 
2.3 The law of one price 
Arguably, in a world without transportation costs and with perfect price transparency, 
arbitrage would work perfectly well. Consumers would shop across the border in case of 
international price differentials, such that gross prices equalize. This scenario describes the 
absolute version of the LOOP and assumes that eventually gross price equalization can be 
expected, regardless of differences in tax rates or producer prices. Hence, the absolute version 
of the LOOP can directly be deduced from the OCP of taxation.  
So far, research found little evidence for the absolute version of the LOOP. Only 
recently, some panel studies for selected products seem to support the convergence 
hypothesis, although convergence takes place at a very slow speed (see Goldberg and 
Verboven, 2001, for references). As results by Asplund and Friberg (2001) show, the LOOP 
may not even hold for identical products at the same location, if denominated differently. 
In case of gasoline prices, consumer price convergence is not per se the most likely 
scenario. It has to be investigated whether price differentials can create sufficiently strong 
pressure on a country’s gross prices, in particular if a country is rather large. Michaelis (2004) 
shows that Germans are willing to drive an additional 1.5 to 3 kilometres for each Euro cent 
price differential compared to a neighboring country in case of euro super and 2 to 4 for 
diesel.
6 Given the existing 2003 price differentials between Germany and its neighbors this 
relates to an average distance of about 30 to 35 kilometres. Often, in the border regions there 
are only few gas stations left on the side of the high-price country. Because of this, the 
pressure on prices may not trigger down into more central regions of the country and, 
therefore, countries also do not engage too heavily in price competition which puts pressure 
on tax rates.  
While for cars the distance to the next cheaper country in terms of gasoline prices 
plays a significant role, trucks on long-distance tours have large tanks and may decide not to 
refuel in a high-price/high-tax country.
7 Evidence for the existence of strong incentives, 
particularly for international freight hauliers, to behave in this way has been presented by 
OECD (1997). The reason is that excise duty (excluding VAT) alone accounts for about 10 to 
12 percent of the running costs of road haulage business (EU Commission, 2002).
8 Refuelling 
in low-price/low-tax countries is therefore an important competitive advantage and fuelling 
                                                 
6 This estimate assumes restricted rationality in the sense that only the need for additional gasoline is included in 
the cost-benefit calculation of an individual, but not costs such as the wear out of the car or the expected costs of 
accidents. Considering perfect rationality implies lower distances per Euro cent of price difference. 
7 Large trucks have a cruising range of 1,500 to 3,000 kilometers (EU Commission, 2002).  
8 Excise duty (excluding VAT) represents about 60 percent of the pump price for diesel fuel, and fuel represents 
on average 15 to 20 percent of the running costs of road haulage business.  
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behavior becomes elastic in demand (Evers, de Mooij and Vollbergh, 2004). Trucks fuel 
diesel only and account for the larger share of all diesel-engined vehicles in Europe, therefore 
international price competition is likely to be fierce. In terms of price convergence, we would 
expect a faster speed of convergence for diesel than for euro super gasoline. For the future, 
this effect should become even more pronounced as a 2002 EU directive aims at harmonizing 
diesel taxation in all member states until 2010.
9
Due to this indeterminacy regarding expected price convergence, it is useful to 
consider the relative version of the LOOP as well. Here, after an asymmetric price shock 
convergence takes place but level differences between countries may still exist. The reason 
for level differences lies with market segmentation which prevents perfect arbitrage. 
Competition cannot drive down prices to a common level. For the gasoline market, the 
absolute version of the LOOP seems to be too strong an assumption as noticeable price 
differences obviously exist. The question is therefore whether or not the relative version of the 
LOOP holds and how market segmentation may be explained.   
In terms of the tax principles, the relative version of the LOOP fits to both the DCP 
and to any intermediate solution. If for producer prices the absolute version of the LOOP 
holds, there is evidence for the DCP to work smoothly. Otherwise, there exists some 
intermediate solution which implies markets are segmented.  
Next to euro super and diesel, our analysis includes two further oil products for 
comparison: heating gasoil
10 and fuel oil with a sulphur content of less than 1 percent.
11 
Heating gasoil is mainly used in private households, while fuel oil is for industrial purposes. 
Gasoil is usually bought locally as transportation is rather costly, so one would expect 
competition to be less fierce. It is also uncommon to shop for gasoil across the border. For 
fuel oil, a prediction is somewhat more difficult. Usually, firms cannot avoid national 
taxation, but on the other hand international competition for firms and investments might keep 
tax rates low.
12 As large firms usually have a rather strong market position in relation to oil 
suppliers and can easily buy fuel oil from foreign suppliers, strong price competition and low 
                                                 
9 See EU Commission (2002): Starting in 2003 a central tax rate will be set at €350 within a band within which 
rates may fluctuate by plus or minus €100. While the central rate will annually be corrected on the basis of the 
harmonized CPI, the band will be zero to zero until 2010.  
10 Notice that diesel gasoline is also known as automotive gasoil, while in this context we consider heating 
gasoil. Both varieties are almost identical, the difference is mainly in the use and in the level of taxation. 
Automotive gasoil is taxed at a higher rate. Heating gasoil can be distinguished from automotive gasoil through 
additives (heating gasoil is red-colored and contains Solvent Yellow 124 as a chemical marker).  
11 Since 2003, fuel oil with higher sulphur content is no longer allowed in the EU. 
12 The extent of tax competition between EU/OECD countries is subject to controversial debate. See Dreher 
(2003) for a recent empirical analysis. 
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tax rates may lead to a high convergence speed. For this product the DCP applies, such that 
producer price convergence should occur. 
 
3. Data 
The data is taken from the EU Oil Bulletin. According to Council Decision 
1999/280/EC, each member state is required to provide information on crude oil supply prices 
and consumer prices of petroleum products on a weekly basis. We consider "at the pump" 
prices for four different products: euro super gasoline, diesel (automotive gasoil), gasoil 
(heating gasoil) and fuel oil. Prices are denominated in ECU or Euro. Given the information 
on taxes and duties, producer prices can easily be derived. The longest available time series 
starts in January 1994 and ends with the EU eastern enlargement in May 2004. This is 
equivalent to 505 weeks. While in 1994 only 12 countries are considered, starting in 1995 
(EU northern enlargement) data for 15 countries is available.     
 
4. Results on convergence 
The LOOP implies that profit incentives and market forces induce the prices for the 
same product sold in different markets to tend to converge to the same level. This implies that 
the time series of relative prices is mean reverting, or stationary. To test for stationarity it is 
common practice to apply unit root tests, where rejection of the unit root hypothesis implies 
that the time series of relative prices are stationary, and will in the long-run converge. If the 
test fails to reject the unit root hypothesis, relative prices follow a random walk and any 
deviation in prices becomes permanent. 
 
4.1. Univariate unit root test 
We will first apply the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to each individual time 
series to examine whether the relative price series is stationary. The optimal number of lags to 
be included has been determined using the Ng and Perron (1995) sequential t test on the 
highest order lag coefficient. We estimate the following equation for each country and each 
product: 
∆ pc p p ijt ij ij ijt ijt ijt z
z
Z
ijt =+ + + −−
= ∑ αβ 1
1
∆ ε , (3) 
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where  pp p ijt ijt jt = ln( / ),
13 ∆ is a first difference operator() ∆ppp ijt ijt ijt =− −1 and ε is 
an error term; i, j and t represent country, product and time, respectively. Z is the optimal 
number of lags. The constant term is included to capture country-specific characteristics, like 
taxes, market structure, the price elasticity of demand and specific geographics. As will be 
discussed in detail below, the individual country dummies capture whether prices converge to 
absolute price parity (zero mean) or relative price parity (non-zero mean). 
Table 1 reports the countries where the univariate ADF test rejects the unit root 
hypothesis at conventional levels of significance. As can be seen from column 1, for 
consumer prices the unit root hypothesis is rejected in the minority of countries and products. 
At the ten percent level of significance, euro super converges to the law of one price in five 
countries only. For diesel, convergence can be found in 7 countries, for gasoil in 6 countries 
and for fuel oil in 8 countries. The actual number of countries in which the unit root 
hypothesis is rejected appears to be rather low. Obviously, there is little support for 
convergence according to the OCP. A closer look at tax rates reveals that there have been 
several tax rate changes over the 10-year time period in the data set. While VAT remained 
constant in most countries, excise taxes were in some countries raised twice in every year. 
The most significant changes happened to euro super, while excise taxes on fuel oil did hardly 
change. Hence, even if prices tend to converge, this may have been overcompensated by tax 
rate effects. Not surprisingly, price convergence occurred in most countries for fuel oil for 
which taxes do not play a significant role, such that mainly market forces determine prices.  
Removing the impact of VAT and gasoline excise taxes, producer price convergence 
can be investigated next. A significantly larger number of converging countries indicates that 
DCP can be sustained. Column 2 of Table 1 confirms this expectation for euro super, gasoil 
and fuel oil. For euro super, the number of convergent countries doubles while for both gasoil 
and fuel oil the number increases by two countries. This implies that markets are sufficiently 
segmented such that market forces do not interfere with the DCP. On the other hand, taxation 
of all consumer goods should follow the same principle, which is the OCP within the EU, 
even if some other principle can be chosen as well. Furthermore, with expected further 
deepening of European integration additional pressure on consumer prices will most likely 
occur.  
                                                 
13 This definition of price variation follows Cecchetti, Mark and Sonora (2002), O’Connell and Wei (2002) and 
Fan and Wei (2003). Our benchmark is thus the average price for each product at time t over all countries. We 
also perform tests with Germany and, respectively, France as benchmark country. Therefore, instead of testing 
whether prices in different countries converge to the cross-country average, we analyze whether prices in 
different countries converge to those in Germany or France. As one problem with this approach, however, the 
results are usually not robust to the choice of the base country (Parsley and Wei 1995, Papell 1997). We come 
back to this in section 5. 
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In our estimate, a first indication of the latter effect can be observed with diesel where 
the unit root hypothesis is rejected in one country less for producer prices than for consumer 
prices. Due to the increasing importance of international road haulage, convergence of “at the 
pump” prices occurs more often. However, a limitation of our results should be mentioned. 
Some countries which showed consumer-price convergence do no longer converge for 
producer prices. A possible explanation is that on average increasing tax rates generate an 
artificial upward trend to which some countries converge to because prices in these countries 
increase in general. Without taxes, the general price increases can still be observed but the 
artificial upward trend is removed. 
In summary, the univariate ADF tests provide support for the hypothesis of long-run 
price parity in the gasoline market for some countries and products, but not for others. For 
producer prices convergence is more pronounced than for consumer prices, except for diesel. 
In general, this provides evidence for the sustainability of the DCP. However, the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test is well known to have low power in distinguishing the unit root null from 
stationary alternatives (Maddala and Wu 1999); the test tends to reject the stationarity 
hypothesis too often, thus providing only a lower level of the number of countries with prices 
converging. 
 
4.2. Panel unit root test 
To overcome the problem of low power of the univariate ADF test, Maddala and Wu 
(1999) and Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), among others, proposed unit root tests based on panel 
data. The Maddala-Wu test is applicable to both unbalanced and balanced panel data sets and 
allows the autocorrelation coefficients to differ across panel members. Specifically, the 
Maddala-Wu test consists in first testing the unit root for each cross-sectional unit separately. 




log( ) p value ij
n
N
.   (4) 
The test statistic follows a chi-squared distribution with 2N degrees of freedom; N 
being the number of countries. 
The unit root test proposed by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), to the contrary, imposes a 
cross-equation restriction on the first order autocorrelation coefficients; the coefficient α is not 
allowed to vary across countries but is restricted to be equal. The Levin-Lin-Chu approach is 
thus the more conservative test. Equation (3) is estimated jointly for all countries and 
products. The cij capture dummies for countries and, respectively, products that account for 
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product-specific price differences that do not vary over time across countries. Like the other 
tests, the equation thus examines the relative version of the law of one price, and the absolute 
values of cij are of interest in itself, since large values would indicate market segmentation. 
Following Goldberg and Verboven (2004), we estimate two types of panels. First, we 
only pool over countries and run regressions for each product separately. Second, we pool 
over countries and products. In both cases, the number of lags is determined employing the 
top-down approach of Campbell and Perron (1991). We start with lag length 15 and reduce 
the number of lags until the longest lag is significant at the five percent level at least. 
Table 2 contains the results regarding consumer prices. Turning to the Maddala-Wu 
panel unit root test, the Table shows that we can reject the null of a unit root for all products at 
the one percent level of significance: There is a strong tendency for consumer prices to 
converge to the LOOP. This does in principle support the OCP which shifts the tax burden to 
producers. High-tax countries put thus a strain on their domestic firms’ competitiveness, if 
they are taxed according to the DCP. However, it will be necessary to compare this result to 
the estimate of producer price convergence. Since we are dealing with a dynamic process, a 
faster speed of convergence of producer prices implies that the outcome of the DCP has been 
achieved more easily in the past. 
Table 2 also contains the results for the Levin-Lin-Chu panel unit root tests. Since the 
panel has to be balanced for conducting the test – and we do not have observations for all 
countries in 1994 – we lose one year of data. In applying the panel test to gasoil and fuel oil, 
we have to omit Portugal, and, respectively, Ireland and Great Britain, again due to data 
availability. Those country/product combinations are thus also omitted from the pooled 
country/product analysis. 
In column 1, we report estimates for the model pooled over countries and products; the 
models pooled over countries only are reproduced in columns 2-5. In column 1, our 
coefficient estimate for α is -0.04, with a t-statistic of -21.10. At the one percent level of 
significance, this exceeds the critical value reported by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), so we 
reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. Looking at the results for individual products, the 
hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the five percent level for euro super, and at the one 
percent level for diesel, gasoil and fuel oil.
14 Price convergence has taken place, however, 
                                                 
14 As one problem with the analysis, changes in nominal exchange rates might be responsible for observed 
convergence. Following Goldberg and Verboven (2004) we therefore also estimated equations including up to 
ten lags of the weekly changes in exchange rates to capture changes in cross-country price differentials resulting 
from short-term nominal rigidities. As it turns out, the exchange rate variables are always jointly insignificant at 
conventional levels. The estimated speed of convergence does not change when those variables are included. 
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only to a relative level as at least some country dummies significantly differ from zero and 
level differences exist. 
As can be seen, not all country dummies are individually significant at conventional 
levels. They are, however, jointly significant at the one percent level in all equations. By 
dividing these fixed effects by –α of equation (3), the long-term systematic price differential 
across countries is obtained. For euro super, the long-term price differentials take values 
between 27 percent below average (Greece) and 15 percent above (United Kingdom). Long-
run price differentials are 22 percent below average in Luxembourg. The results show that 
long run diesel prices are approximately 24 percent lower than average in Greece, and 39 
percent higher than average in the UK. Gasoil, to the contrary, is in the long run cheapest in 
the UK, and most expensive in Italy; the lowest long-term fuel oil prices can be found in 
Belgium and the highest in Denmark.  
The main explanation for these level differences can clearly be deduced from looking 
at national tax rates, given that producer prices do not differ too strongly for the countries 
under consideration. Taking consumer prices, one can easily calculate the tax share for each 
unit of gasoline. The average tax share for euro super is highest in France (76.60 percent) and 
the U.K. (76.44), while it is lowest for Greece (62.03) and Luxembourg (62.00). This is in line 
with our empirical finding that long-term price differentials exceed the average most strongly 
in the U.K. and fell farthest below the average in Greece and Luxembourg. The results are 
similar for diesel (gasoil, fuel oil) where the highest tax share can be found in the U.K. (Italy, 
Denmark). For all products, the lowest tax share can usually be found in Luxembourg. For 
gasoil and fuel oil, however, the United Kingdom and, respectively, Belgium, are close to the 
number for Luxembourg. If price competition on the consumer side is not sufficiently strong, 
tax differentials will remain visible in consumer prices. The tax burden is carried by the 
consumers.  
For comparison, we re-run the analysis employing producer prices instead of 
consumer prices. Following our discussion of tax principles, a persistence of consumer price 
differentials allows generally for producer price convergence according to the DCP. This, 
however, does not exclude the possibility that for producer prices level differences persist as 
well. But we would expect that supply side driven price dynamics and market segmentation 
on the consumer side will lead to faster convergence and smaller level differences in producer 
prices. From Table 3 it can be seen that in fact the coefficient α is greater in absolute terms, 
i.e. the producer price differential is reduced at a faster speed. Furthermore, as the individual 
country dummies show most countries are now much closer to the mean. For euro super, the 
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long-term price differentials now take values between 19 percent below average (United 
Kingdom) and 10 percent above (Austria). Long run diesel prices are approximately 16 
percent lower than average in France, and 14 percent higher than average in Ireland. The 
lowest producer prices for gasoil and fuel oil can be found in the United Kingdom and Austria 
(15 and, respectively, 22 percent below average), the highest in Italy and Portugal (13 and, 
respectively, 23 percent above average). This indicates that price convergence has mainly 
taken place on the producer price side rather than on the consumer price side. On the other 
hand, the number of significant country dummies provides a slightly different picture. For 
diesel, this number is higher for producer prices. This implies that for this product 
competition on the consumer price side is obviously quite strong. Thus, the DCP rather than 
the OCP is supported.  
 
4.3. The speed of convergence 
So far, we found that prices do converge and that this happens with different speeds. 
We can now estimate the exact speed of convergence. In order to do so, we calculate the 
approximate half life of a shock for all convergent price series of each product, using the 
formula ln(0.5)/ln(1+α),
15 where α again denotes the estimated coefficient of equation (3). 
The speed of convergence gives us some insights about the process of European integration 
and the potential need for adapting tax rules to a changing environment. A fast speed of 
convergence is an indication of well-functioning markets with rather strong competition. 
Again the distinction of producer and consumer prices may play a role. Analogous to the 
finding that price convergence is more relevant on the producer price side, we expect the 
speed to be faster on this side as well. 
According to the results for consumer prices, the average half life ranges from 10 
weeks for gasoil to 19 weeks for fuel oil, 33 weeks for diesel, and 41 weeks for euro super. 
Regarding producer prices, the average half lives amount to 8 weeks (fuel oil), 11 weeks (euro 
super) and 13 weeks (diesel and gasoil). 
As expected, the speed of convergence is (except for gasoil) much faster for producer 
prices than for consumer prices. The existence of taxes as well as the changes of tax rates over 
time slow down and sometimes even counteract the process of convergence on the consumer 
price side. Together with the finding that level differences between (at least some) countries 
exist, this is additional evidence that market forces are not sufficiently strong to support gross 
price convergence. The DCP can in principle still be sustained. The most important 
                                                 
15 Note that this formula is an approximation and is only exact for AR(1) processes. 
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implication of this finding is that governments have scope for discretionary tax policy as the 
tax burden can be shifted to consumers. In particular, the slow speed of convergence of the 
consumer price for euro super is in line with the relatively highest taxation per unit. Only 
gasoil generates an opposite result. Its consumer price converges fastest of all products, while 
it is slowest in terms of producer prices. In fact, consumer prices converge even faster than 
producer prices. This should, however, not be explained by particularly strong international 
consumer competition as gasoil is traded mainly locally.  
  In comparison to past estimates of the LOOP, our numbers nevertheless appear to be 
rather low. Cross-country analyses of the purchasing power parity, e.g., find half lives of 4 to 
6 years (see Goldberg and Verboven, 2004). More recent studies using panel data get lower 
estimates of about one year. However, there are no other estimates of gasoline and oil price 
convergence, such that a direct comparison with our results is not possible.
16
  Given our results, only the consumer prices for diesel and euro super are close to 
previously estimated numbers for other products. One of the main reasons for the rapid price 
convergence might be the volume and the importance of these markets and the rather strong 
competition between suppliers. Furthermore, on these markets menu costs are very low. Even 
daily price changes create hardly any costs. 
 
4.4. Absolute or relative version of the law of one price 
The previous analysis has focused on the relative version of the LOOP as we allowed 
for a constant term, i.e. for level differences, in equation (3). Our first test in order to 
investigate whether the absolute or relative version of the LOOP holds was to check whether 
all (or at least some) of the constants differ significantly from zero in the univariate unit root 
tests of section 4.1. The number of constants can be calculated and compared for both series 
of relative prices. For consumer prices, the constant term is significant at the ten percent level 
in the majority of the regressions, supporting the hypothesis that the individual price series 
converge to relative rather than absolute parity. Out of the 15 regressions we run for each 
product, the intercept has been significant in ten countries for euro super, nine countries for 
diesel, eleven countries for gasoil, and ten countries for fuel oil. In other words, even if 
convergence occurs, fixed price gaps between countries remain. For the net-of-tax time series, 
the same calculation yields that the intercept term is significant in nine countries for euro 
super, seven countries for diesel and eight countries for gasoil. The number of significant 
intercept terms has instead risen to eleven countries for fuel oil. Except for the last finding, 
                                                 
16 Bentzen (2003) shows convergence of oil prices, but does neither calculate half lives nor publish coefficient 
estimates.  
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these results show again that the process of convergence is more relevant on the producer 
price side as there are fewer countries converging to the relative version of the LOOP only. 
For fuel oil, taxation plays only a minor role and gross and net prices hardly differ. 
Nevertheless, there has been a slow and steady increase in tax rates over time which may 
explain why there are more converging countries on the gross price side. The more interesting 
observation in this context is, however, the large number of significant constants. This 
indicates that market segmentation is rather strong, most likely caused by differing market 
structures. 
It is useful to confirm the findings derived from univariate unit root tests also by 
employing the panel unit root tests by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002). The equation we estimate is 
∆∆ pp p ijt ij ijt ijt ijt z
z
Z
ijt =+ + −−
= ∑ αβ 1
1
ε , (5) 
which is the same as equation (3), except for that we omit the product/country 
dummies. Without those fixed effects, the hypothesis we are testing is whether the price 
differences are converging towards zero in the long-run. 
Again we conduct the test for the pooled country/product sample and the individual 
product samples. As it turns out, the hypothesis of a unit root in consumer prices cannot be 
rejected at conventional levels of significance in any specification (the critical value 
according to Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) being -5.98 at the ten percent level) – there is no 
support for the absolute version of the LOOP. Consumer competition is not sufficiently strong 
to erode price differences. The question remaining unanswered, however, is whether tax 
differentials alone can explain the price differentials. To investigate the issue further, we re-
run our analysis with all prices net of taxes. Obviously, if absolute price differentials are 
completely due to differences in tax rates, price differences might converge to zero once taxes 
are accounted for.  
Turning to the Levin-Lin-Chu test, the null of a unit root is now rejected at the 5 
percent and one percent level of significance for euro super and diesel, respectively, but not 
for fuel oil and gasoil if the product panels are tested individually. For those products which 
are taxed most heavily, taxation is the dominant explanation for market segmentation. Despite 
gasoline tourism and the application of the OCP, market forces are not strong enough to 
equalize price differentials entirely. This is good news for policy makers as it allows for 
discretionary national tax policy without distorting international efficiency of goods 
production. Hence, despite the fact that – for reasons of equal tax treatment of consumer 
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goods – the DCP is no longer relevant its outcome can still be achieved in the markets for 
euro super and diesel. 
This is different for gasoil and fuel oil where net-of-tax prices do not converge in 
absolute terms. Not only are taxes less relevant, but – as a locally traded good – gasoil cannot 
necessarily be expected to show international producer price convergence. For fuel oil, the 
result of the univariate analysis is confirmed. There is no clear evidence for absolute price 
convergence for either of the two series of price differentials. In terms of our discussion of tax 
principles, an intermediate outcome has been achieved which indicates strong influence of 
non-tax variables such as market structure. Our analysis, however, cannot exactly determine 
which factors these are.  
  In the pooled country/ product sample, we now find convergence to the absolute 
version of the law of one price, at the ten percent level of significance. Taking this broad view 
on prices for gasoline and oil products in Europe, we find that there is a tendency of producer 
prices towards becoming perfectly equalized over time. The desired outcome of the DCP, 
namely an internationally efficient goods production, has been achieved within the EU over 
the 10 year period our data cover. For policy makers, it is important to know whether this 
favorable situation is likely to continue in the future. This will be discussed in the following.  
 
4.5. Did the speed of convergence increase over time? 
Most observers expect that with the deepening of European integration arbitrage 
should become easier and that convergence to the LOOP will occur. In this section we 
examine whether markets became more integrated during the ten-year period from 1994 to 
2004. If, particularly on the consumer price side, the process of price convergence has 
speeded up in the past, there is a good chance that this will continue in the future. Sustaining 
the DCP outcome will become more and more difficult, thereby eventually distorting 
production efficiency. If the speed is slow, changes will most likely be negligible for at least 
some time.  
Following Goldberg and Verboven (2004), we address the question of progress in the 
speed of convergence in two ways. First, we estimate the convergence equation for two sub-
periods of our sample, expecting the speed of convergence to be higher in the later period. 
Second, we introduce a trend variable to the unit root equation and interact it with the speed 
of convergence. Again, we would expect the speed of convergence to be higher in more recent 
years. However, if convergence reduced the absolute price differentials, price shocks may be 
eliminated more slowly – not because impediments to arbitrage did not diminish, but because 
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price differentials to be eliminated are smaller as compared to the pre-integration period 
(Goldberg and Verboven 2004). 
To investigate the effects of integration on the speed of convergence, we estimate: 
∆ pc p t r e n d p p ijt ij ij ijt ijt ijt ijt z
z
Z
ijt =+ + ⋅ ⋅ + + −−
= ∑ αα β 11
1
~ ∆ − ε .   (6) 
We start by splitting our sample in two approximately equal sub-periods: 1995-1999 
and 2000-2004. Again, we estimate separate equations for each product, and an equation 
pooled by countries and products. Table 4 contains the results for consumer prices for both 
sub periods and the corresponding changes. As can be seen, at the one percent level of 
significance the speed of convergence increased for all products, except for fuel oil, where the 
speed of convergence did not change significantly over time. Results for producer prices are 
reported in Table 5. Again, the speed of convergence increased significantly for all products, 
except for fuel oil. Surprisingly, however, the difference in the speed of convergence for 
producer fuel oil prices is also significant, but decreased. Comparing the estimated speed of 
convergence between consumer and producer prices is also of interest. As can be seen from 
the tables, producer prices converge faster than consumer prices in both periods of time, the 
exception being gasoil in the earlier period. 
Three remarks concerning our results are in order. First, European integration has in 
fact led to an increase in the speed of price convergence. The important integration steps like 
the Schengen acquis or the monetary union had the desired effect of facilitating international 
arbitrage. This process is likely to continue in the future. Second, as expected, the speed of 
convergence has been faster for producer prices than for consumer prices in all sub periods. 
This is in line with our previous result that convergence can be found mainly for producer 
prices. Third, for the change in the speed of convergence between the sub periods the results 
are ambiguous for the two series of prices. While for diesel and gasoil the change is larger for 
producer than for consumer prices, the opposite holds for euro super. This implies that for the 
latter product the gap between the different speeds is becoming smaller. If this process 
continues in the future, eventually the speed of convergence will be higher for consumer 
prices. This would be an indication that at some time consumer price convergence according 
to the prevailing OCP will occur. Differing tax rates would then lead to a distorted 
international goods production. While it is not yet foreseeable whether and when this will 
happen, policy makers should be aware of the possibility that this development might become 
relevant in the future. Notice that the result for fuel oil cannot clearly be determined as one of 
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the coefficients is insignificant. For producer prices, convergence has even slowed down. This 
confirms our suspicion that impact factors other than taxation play an important role. 
Tables 4 and 5 also contain results for the interaction term in equation (6). As one 
problem with this approach, the distribution of the relevant test statistics is no longer known 
under the null of a unit root (Goldberg and Verboven 2004). Results are thus merely 
suggestive. The results of columns 16-20 show that the interaction term is almost always 
insignificant at conventional levels of significance.
17 It thus seems that faster convergence is 
offset by slower elimination of the reduced price differentials (which are the consequence of 
increased integration).  
 
5. Robustness with respect to variations in the benchmark 
To test for the robustness of our results, we replicate the previous analysis with France 
and Germany as benchmark countries. Instead of testing whether gasoline prices converge to 
the average of the EU-15 prices, we test for convergence to the German or, respectively, the 
French price levels. Germany is the largest EU country, with among the highest taxation of 
gasoline and oil products, and (transit) traffic is particularly heavy. The country may therefore 
have a strong impact on the development of gasoline and oil prices. France, on the other hand, 
is geographically the most central of the large EU member states. Overall, the estimates for 
Germany and France confirm our previous findings with the EU average as benchmark. 
Nevertheless some remarkable differences among the three benchmarks have been revealed. 
This is particularly true for our univariate unit root tests. For German prices as a 
benchmark, there is strong evidence that price convergence takes place with producer prices 
rather than with consumer prices. In fact, for euro super and diesel there is not a single 
country which converges to the German consumer price level. On the other hand, producer 
prices converge in 10 countries for each of the products. For gasoil and fuel oil the number of 
converging countries increases only by one when considering producer prices. one candidate 
explanation for this surprising observation might be the additional green tax levied on euro 
super and diesel in Germany. From 2000 to 2003, this tax was increased by approximately 
€0.03 per litre and year. This additional upward trend has not taken place in any other 
country, so it proved to be an obstacle for convergence. However, except for the consumer 
prices of euro super and diesel the total number of converging countries is almost identical to 
                                                 
17 We also estimated equations where the fixed effects have been interacted with the trend variable, the 
hypothesis being that with increased integration long-term price differences would decline. We did not find any 
systematic evidence. Again, results do not change if the first difference of the exchange rate and its lags are 
included. 
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the EU average benchmark which shows that prices in Germany follow a similar pattern of 
movement as the European average. 
For French gasoil consumer prices, a similar result as for German euro super and 
diesel prices can be found. The number of converging countries increases from 1 to 10 when 
taxes are removed. The reason is again an extreme change in tax policy. In 2000 France was 
the only country in Europe to cut gasoil excise tax rates significantly (by approximately 60 
percent) after strong public protests against increasing oil prices. For the other products the 
number of converging countries changes hardly as there is only one country more or less 
when consumer and producer prices are compared. However, the total number of converging 
countries is rather low and ranges between 1 and 5 countries only. This implies that the 
movement of prices in France is rather different from the rest of Europe. 
The Levin-Lin-Chu panel unit root test rejects the unit root hypothesis at the 1 percent 
level of significance and with a coefficient estimate for consumer price convergence of 
approximately -0.04 for all three benchmarks. This shows that our estimate is in general 
robust against the specification of the benchmark country as the overall speed of convergence 
is identical. Considering individual products, the estimated coefficients differ slightly between 
benchmarks. However, they also support the findings of the univariate unit root tests. For the 
German benchmark the coefficients for euro super and diesel are insignificant, for the French 
benchmark the speed of convergence is lowest for gasoil. The Maddala-Wu statistic shows the 
same pattern, except that it is insignificant for euro super in the French benchmark as well.     
For producer prices all three benchmarks show the expected results. The coefficient 
estimates are almost identical for France and the EU average. The only remarkable difference 
is that with the German benchmark the speed of convergence is substantially higher compared 
to the other benchmarks. In this respect, German producer prices appear to be a benchmark 
explaining price movements in Europe quite well. One of the reasons for this result might be 
that German producer prices follow closely the development of crude oil prices at the spot 
markets due to strong supply-side competition. In our analysis it was nevertheless not useful 
taking Germany as the general benchmark because of the special behaviour of consumer 
prices due to the German green taxes. 
 
  20 
6. Conclusion 
The process of European integration aims at facilitating arbitrage in order to increase 
overall welfare of European citizens. Eventually any price differential due to artificial trade 
barriers or market segmentation should vanish, only differentials caused by differing 
transportation costs may remain. While this ultimate goal is in the citizens’ interest, it may be 
in conflict with tax revenue goals of member states’ governments. The taxation of gasoline 
and oil products is a major revenue source for most European governments. However, with 
open borders governments are not free to choose tax rates as citizens may decide to shop 
abroad if the destination-country principle in taxation cannot be imposed. In this case, the 
demand for these products is rather price elastic. Formally for euro super and diesel the 
origin-country principle holds, taxing the products in the country in which they are bought 
only. If cross-border shopping takes place, domestic tax rates may be under pressure to fall 
because consumer prices may equalize due to arbitrage. However, the question is whether 
arbitrage is sufficiently strong to induce this effect, thereby restricting the possibility of a 
national tax policy.  
Our analysis investigated this question by considering European consumer and 
producer price convergence over the last 11 years. We found that evidence for consumer price 
convergence (indicating successful arbitrage) is far less than evidence for producer price 
convergence which supports the destination-country principle. Producer prices converge both 
in more countries and at a higher speed. However, neither consumer nor producer prices 
converge to the absolute version of the law of one price. Not only is arbitraging rather weak, 
but market segmentation still exists in the sense that level differences between countries 
remain permanently. In case of producer prices this may be explained by several reasons such 
as differing transportation costs, market power or price elasticities. For consumer prices, tax 
differentials have to be added to these arguments. Our findings are robust with respect to 
variations of the benchmark. This provides evidence that national tax policy regarding 
gasoline is still possible for EU member states as arbitrage is not sufficiently strong to erode 
price – and thus tax – differentials.  
Whether this finding will hold in the future is questionable as further integration steps 
can be expected allowing for even better arbitrage opportunities. We found that the speed of 
price convergence has increased over time, although for both consumer and producer prices. 
In particular for diesel taxation changes can be expected as the demand for diesel becomes 
increasingly highly elastic due to long-range road haulage. Tax differentials will vanish in the 
future and national governments are already considering new sources of tax revenue. In 
  21 
Germany, for example, a new road-use fee for trucks will be introduced in 2005. However, 
our estimates show that so far there has been no need to react on European integration by 
changing tax rates.  
Our analysis yielded another important result. While the analysis of price convergence 
based on the LOOP has focussed on gross consumer prices so far, we find that convergence 
may take place on the net-of-tax or producer price side as well, even if sales prices do not 
converge. Obviously, this result requires tax instruments beyond the VAT. As soon as specific 
excise taxes for a product play a significant role, this effect might prevail. Further research on 
this topic is needed in order to find out for which products this approach may become 
relevant. An obvious starting point would be to look at tobacco products which are highly 
taxed as well.  
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Table 1: Univariate Augmented Dickey Fuller Test (03/01/1994-3/5/2004) 
Convergent countries (percent level) 
consumer prices  producer prices 
Euro Super  Finland (1) 
Ireland (5) 
Italy (1) 












Diesel   Finland (1) 
France (1) 

















































b: longest available time-series ranges from 03/01/1994-10/01/2000. 
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Table 2: Consumer Prices, Levin-Lin-Chu and Maddala-Wu panel unit root tests 
(2/1/1995-3/5/2004) 




Diesel Gas  Fuel  Oil 
pijt-1 -0.04* -0.0167**  -0.0206*  -0.0704*  -0.036* 
Austria -0.04*  -0.0011* -0.0009 -0.0087* -0.0110*
Belgium -0.06*  0.0005 -0.0013** -0.0338* -0.0179*
Denmark 0.03*  0.0014** 0.0006 0.0330* 0.0270*
Finland -0.03*  0.0017* -0.0001 -0.0145* 0.0007
France -0.04*  0.0010
o 0.0002 -0.0079* -0.0109*
Germany -0.05*  0.0006* 0.0002 -0.0204* -0.0159*
Greece -0.05*  -0.0045* -0.0050* 0.0013* -0.0036*
Ireland 0.002*
,b -0.0018* 0.0009 -0.0132* n.a.
d
Italy -0.002*  0.0015* 0.0022* 0.0457* -0.0083*
Luxembourg -0.07*  -0.0037* -0.0043* -0.0318* -0.0151*





Spain   -0.05*  -0.0033* -0.0031* -0.0148* -0.0052*
Sweden 0.02*  0.0012** 0.0015** 0.0242* 0.0263*
United Kingdom  0.01*
,b 0.0025* 0.0081* -0.0345* n.a.
d
Maddala-Wu Statistic
e  62.48*  83.11*  100.56*  84.82* 
Number of lags  1  9  9  13  10 
Country/ Product dummies  Yes  No  No  No  No 




o: significant at the one, five and, respectively, 10 percent level. 
a: Fixed effects are averaged for Euro Super, Diesel, Gas and Fuel Oil. 
b: Average excludes Fuel Oil due to missing observations. 
c: Average excludes Gas due to missing observations. 
d: Country not included due to missing observations. 
e: Maddala-Wu test statistic based on the univariate ADF of Table 1. 
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Table 3: Producer Prices, Levin-Lin-Chu and Maddala-Wu panel unit root tests 
(2/1/1995-3/5/2004) 




Diesel Gas Fuel  Oil 
pijt-1 -0.06* -0.0607*  -0.0516*  -0.0509*  -0.0839* 
Austria  -0.013* 0.0059* 0.0043* -0.0021 -0.0187*
Belgium  -0.029* -0.0009 0.0011 -0.0073* -0.0155*
Denmark  -0.035* 0.0017 -0.0010 0.0062* -0.0093*
Finland  -0.008* -0.0007 0.0033** -0.0037* 0.0072*
France  -0.011* -0.0107* -0.0080* 0.0017 -0.0052*
Germany  -0.005* -0.0056* -0.0034* -0.0032** -0.0161*
Greece  -0.032* 0.0001 -0.0072* -0.0034** 0.0054*
Ireland  -0.009*
,b 0.0032** 0.0073* 0.0058*    n.a.
d
Italy  -0.020* 0.0038* 0.0016 0.0068* -0.0008*
Luxembourg  0.034* 0.0011 -0.0016 0.0003 -0.0057*
Netherlands  0.001* 0.0054* 0.0027** 0.0062* 0.0068*
Portugal  -0.015*
,c 0.0037* -0.0030**   n.a.
d 0.0193*
Spain   0.011* -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0050* 0.0132*
Sweden  0.006* 0.0009 0.0055* 0.0005 0.0065*
United Kingdom  0.0004*
,b -0.0115* -0.0046* -0.0077* n.a.
d
Maddala-Wu Statistic
e  102.13*  143.86*  82.15*  140.29* 
Number of lags  1  9  9  13  10 
Country/ Product dummies  Yes  No  No  No  No 




o: significant at the one, five and, respectively, 10 percent level. 
a: Fixed effects are averaged for Euro Super, Diesel, Gas and Fuel Oil. 
b: Average excludes Fuel Oil due to missing observations. 
c: Average excludes Gas due to missing observations. 
d: Country not included due to missing observations. 
e: Maddala-Wu test statistic based on the univariate ADF of Table 1. 
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Table 4: Did the Speed of Convergence in Consumer Prices Increase Over Time? 
 1995-1999 




Diesel Gasoil  Fuel  Oil 
pijt-1 -0.04* -0.01  -0.01  -0.09*  -0.07** 
Country/product dummies  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Country dummies  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 2000-2004 




Diesel Gasoil  Fuel  Oil 
pijt-1 -0.09* -0.06* -0.07* -0.14*  -0.09* 
Country/product dummies  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Country dummies  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
  Changes from (1995-1999) to (2000-2004) 




Diesel Gasoil  Fuel  Oil 
∆pijt-1 0.05* 0.05* 0.06* 0.05*  0.02 
  Interaction with trend term 




Diesel Gasoil  Fuel  Oil 
pijt-1 -0.04* -0.01  -0.02  -0.06*  -0.04* 
trend*pijt-1 -0.00001 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.0004 -0.00002 
 
Notes: 
*, **: significant at the one and, respectively, 5 percent level. 
a: Fixed effects are averaged for Euro Super, Diesel, Gas and Fuel Oil. 
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Table 5: Did the Speed of Convergence in Producer Prices Increase Over Time? 
 1995-1999 




Diesel Gasoil  Fuel  Oil 
pijt-1 -0.09* -0.08* -0.05* -0.08* -0.13* 
Country/product dummies  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Country dummies  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 2000-2004 




Diesel Gasoil  Fuel  Oil 
pijt-1 -0.10* -0.10* -0.13* -0.19* -0.10* 
Country/product dummies  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Country dummies  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
  Changes from (1995-1999) to (2000-2004) 




Diesel Gasoil  Fuel  Oil 
∆pijt-1 0.01* 0.02**  0.08* 0.11* -0.03** 
  Interaction with trend term 




Diesel Gasoil  Fuel  Oil 
pijt-1 -0.05* -0.04  -0.02  -0.04  -0.09* 
trend*pijt-1 -0.00002* -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.00003  -0.00002 
 
Notes: 
*, **: significant at the one and, respectively, 5 percent level. 
a: Fixed effects are averaged for Euro Super, Diesel, Gas and Fuel Oil. 
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